Saturday, November 16, 2019

Framework for Safeguarding Confidentiality in Children

Framework for Safeguarding Confidentiality in Children When dealing with adults who lack capacity and children, a medical professional often has to make a difficult choice between safeguarding confidentiality and making disclosures to protect the particular patients welfare. CRITICALLY DISCUSS the extent to which the legal framework has so far succeeded when addressing the balancing exercise referred to above and whether confidentiality for these groups of patients is sufficiently safeguarded. Introduction: In this paper, through reference to the jurisprudence of the courts of England and Wales, the author will critically discuss the extent to which the law has managed to strike an appropriate balance between protecting the rights of children and adult patients who lack capacity, on the one hand; and, allowing medical professionals to make disclosures when such disclosures are deemed to be in the best interests of their patients, on the other. The structure of this paper will be as follows: First, the author will examine the legal basis for any rights to confidentiality and non-disclosure that are conferred on children and adult patients who lack capacity, by the law of England and Wales. Second, the author will identify the legal provisions and/or common law decisions which purport to allow medical professionals to act in contravention of these rights, when to do so is deemed in the best interests of their patients. Third, the author will perform a review of the jurisprudence of the courts of England and Wales to determine the legal scope of these justified derogations. Fourth, the author will perform a literature review to indentify the extent to which medical professionals, in practice, manage to apply their discretion appropriately. Finally, the author will review the various mechanisms in place, if any, to review the conduct of medical professionals and hold accountable any medical professionals who fail to adhere to the limits of the discretion conferred upon them by the law of England and Wales. What is/are the legal basis/bases for the right to confidentiality enjoyed by children and adult patients who lack capacity? 2.1 Children patients who lack capacity and their ‘right(s)’ to confidentiality: Before the rights of this select group of patients to confidentiality are examined, it is first important to define what is meant by ‘children patients who lack capacity’. In this context, we are referring to the ‘capacity’ to provide legally valid consent to their doctors or other medical professionals to disclose their confidential medical information to third parties. Under statute, a child patient will be presumed to possess sufficient capacity to consent in the regard the moment that they have attained the age of 16 years. This is provided by section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, subsection (1) of which provides: â€Å"The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.† Of course, this is merely a presumption. A particular child patient may have characteristics which invalidate this consent, even though they are over the age of 16. For example, if they qualify as a person who lacks consent under section 2 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which provides that: â€Å"[A] person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.† It matters not whether this ‘impairment’ or ‘disturbance’ is temporary or permanent[1], but assessments must be made on the basis of the actual decision-making capacity of the individual[2], rather than through reference merely to the type of condition or impairment which that child is suffering from[3]. Such assessments are to be made on the balance of probabilities[4], i.e. a child patient who is between 16 and 18 years old wi ll be deemed to lack the necessary capacity to consent if it is more likely than not that he or she is unable to fully appreciate the implications of the decision which needs to be made. A child over the age of 16 may also be deemed to lack capacity to consent when they are physically unable to provide consent; for example, if they are unconscious[5]. Similarly, the presumption that a child under the age of 16 lacks the necessary capacity to consent can be rebutted if, upon an assessment of the decision-making ability of that patient, it is deemed that he or she â€Å"[has] achieve[d] a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed.[6]† A minor who possesses this required threshold of understanding and intelligence will be said to be ‘Gillick competent’. However, it is highly unlikely that a child under the age of 13 will ever be deemed so competent[7]. In conclusion, in this paper, when referring to child patients who lack capacity, we are referring (1) to minors who are under the age of 16 but who are not deemed to be Gillick competent; and, (2) to children who are 16 or 17 years of age, but who lack the necessary capacity to provide informed consent, perhaps because they are deemed to fail the test provided by section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; or, perhaps because they are unconscious, and are therefore physically unable to provide any consent whatsoever. Having established the categories of patient to which we are referring, now let us examine the legal bases for their ‘right’ to confidentiality: One such legal basis is provided by the Data Protection Act 1998, which was enacted to give effect to European Council Directive 95/46/EC. This Act creates a legal presumption that personal data may not be processed unless it is lawful to do so[8], it is processed fairly[9] and certain conditions are satisfied. In regard to the conditions which must be satisfied: Schedule 2 and 3 of the 1998 Act provide a list of conditions and, in order for information to be processed in accordance with the Act, at least one condition from both sections must be satisfied[10]. These conditions will be discussed at length in section 3 of this paper, when we turn to examine under what circumstances a medical professional is lawfully justified to make disclosure when it is deemed in the best interests of a patient’s welfare. In regard to the requirement of fairness, in the medical context, Stauch et al (2002) write: â€Å"To be ‘fair’ the data must, in general terms, have been obtained from the patient honestly or in accordance with a legal obligation; the patient must have been told the purposes for which the information is to be processed; and the rules for providing access to the data subject must also have been observed.[11]† In regard to when it is deemed unlawful to process personal medical information, no definition of lawfulness is provided by the Data Protection Act 1998[12]. One can only assume that this refers to the legal requirements provided under the common law and also under the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides: â€Å"(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.† In the recent case of Rose v. Secretary of State for Health [2002][13] it has been held that this right is conferred on all citizens, including children. However, from the wording of the Article, in particular Article 8(2) it is immediately clear that this right to confidentiality is subject to a broad public policy category of exception. The category of exception will be analysed in greater detail in section 3 of t his paper, when we turn to examine under what circumstances a medical professional is lawfully justified to make disclosure when it is deemed in the best interests of a patient’s welfare. In regard to the common law right to privacy, this right is based upon equitable principle and therefore a breach of this right gives rise to a civil law cause of action only. Similar, but distinct, from the law of tort, one of the requirements which needs to be established before a common law right to confidentiality can be deemed to have arisen in any given case is a duty of confidentiality. This might arise from a contractual relationship between the parties or, in the medical context, simply from the fact that medical professionals are duty bound to respect the confidentiality of their patients[14]. However, this duty is also subject to a public interest exception: In this case of W v Edgell [1990][15], it was held by Lord Justice Bingham, who provided the leading judgment in this case, that: â€Å"the law treats such duties not as absolute but as liable to be overridden where there is held to be a stronger public interest in disclosure.[16]† To what extent the welfare of a child patient who lacks capacity to consent can serve as such a ‘public policy’ justification for derogation of this duty by medical professionals will form part of the subject of discussion in section 3 of this paper, below. 2.2 Adult patients who lack capacity and their ‘right(s)’ to confidentiality: An adult patient will be deemed to lack capacity either where he or she is unable, physically, to provide consent to disclosure; or, where that patient is deemed to lack capacity in accordance with the assessment criteria established under section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This group of patients enjoy the same rights to confidentiality as the children discussed in the previous subsection of this section of the paper; namely, they have a right under the Data Protection Act 1998 to have their personal data processed fairly and lawfully and only where certain pre-defined conditions has been satisfied; the right to privacy as provided by Article 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (but, likewise, subject to the public policy exceptions provided by Article 8(2) of that Act); and, the common law right to confidentiality. What is/are the legal basis/bases on which medical professionals are entitled to derogate from the right to confidentiality otherwise enjoyed by their children and adult patients who lack capacity, when derogation is deemed to be in the best interest of their patients’ welfare? In the previous section of this paper, we established that each of the various legal bases for the right to confidentiality and non-disclosure of children and adult patients who lack capacity are subject to exceptions. In regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and also the common law duty to maintain patient confidentiality, the exception is one based upon considerations of ‘public policy’. In regard to the Data Protection Act 1998, the ‘exceptions’ are provided by Schedule 2 and 3 of the Act which set out a list of conditions, at least one from each schedule of which must be satisfied in order for a medical professional to be deemed entitled to disclose (i.e. ‘process’) the confidential information of his or her patients to 3rd parties. Let us now turn to examine to what extent ‘the welfare of these patients’ can be deemed a legitimate public policy justification for derogating from these patients’ right to confidentiality and also to what extent the conditions provided in schedule 2 and 3 of the Data Protection Act 1998 might be capable of being satisfied by considerations of patient welfare. Before we embark upon this analysis, it is important to remind ourselves of the practical circumstances with which a medical professional might be confronted when treating children or adult patients who lack capacity: First, it should be remembered that such medical professionals will not be able to ask these patients for consent, because they, by definition, are either physically or mentally incapable of providing such consent; and, second, in the context of children patients who lack consent and who are under the age of 16, medical professionals are required by law to involve the parents or legal guardians of those patients in any decision-making processes pertaining to the treatment of their children—therefore issues of disclosure to these types of third party are irrelevant[17]. Bearing these limitations in mind, let us examine the various categories of exception which operate to allow medical professionals to make disclosures in the absence of any consent (but not where consent has been withheld by the parents or legal guardians of the patients in question). The first point to note is that medical professionals are fully entitled to disclose medical information to other medical professionals who are also involved in the treatment of a child or adult patient who lacks capacity. Such disclosure is permissible under the Data Protection Act 1998 because one condition from Schedule 2 and one Condition from Schedule 3 are both satisfied; namely, the condition provided by s6(1) of Schedule 2 to the Act, which staes that, â€Å"[t]he processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject;† and, the condition provided by s8(1) of Schedule 3 to the Act, which provides: â€Å"[t]he processing is necessary for medical purposes and is undertaken by— (a) a health professional , or (b) a person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality which is equivalent to that which would arise if that person were a health professional..† Such disclosures are made in the interests of the welfare of the patient, although assessments do not need to be made on a case-by-case basis as it is generally assumed that disclosure across medical professionals is legitimate and that consent for such disclosures would not be withheld. In regard to making disclosures to other non-medical parties: The various exceptions identified in the previous section of this paper all depend upon derogation being justified in the ‘public interest’. In regard to Article 8(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the words â€Å"necessary in the interests of the protection of health or morals,† does seem to suggest that derogation on grounds of the welfare of a particular patient would be deemed justified. This has been confirmed by the courts in the case of Z v Finland (1998)[18]. In regard to the common law duty to maintain patient confidentiality, we have already cited the case of W v Edgell [1990][19] as providing authority for the assertion that this duty can be overridden by competing public interests. It is highly unlikely that the Courts would wish to undermine the decisions of medical professions in this regard; after all, medical professionals are best qualified to determine how important disclosure is in any given case and therefore whether the duty of confidence should be overridden. As Bainham (2005) writes: â€Å"[I]t is debateable how far the courts would want to question, retrospectively the clinical judgment of the medical profession.[20]† In regard to making disclosures to non-medical 3rd parties under the Data Protection Act 1998, while little direct guidance can be found within the wording of the 1998 Act itself, the General Medical Council (2000), at paragraph 27 of its official publication entitled ‘Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information’, seems to suggest that disclosure on grounds of patient welfare will be considered a justified processing aim under the Data Protection Act 1998: â€Å"Disclosure of personal information without consent may be justified in the public interest where failure to do so may expose the patient to risk of death or serious harm. Where the patient [is] exposed to a risk so serious that it outweighs the patient’s privacy interest, you should seek consent to disclosure where practicable. If it is not practicable to seek consent, you should disclose information promptly to an appropriate person or authority.† It must be noted that this guidance notes does not suggest that disclosure will be justified where the risk to the patient is only minor, but provides no insight into how to assess the seriousness of any given welfare risk. Of course, if death is a risk faced by the patient if disclosure is not made, then this will automatically be deemed sufficiently serious. The legal framework: How have the courts of England and Wales purported to strike an appropriate balance between protecting the rights (to confidentiality) of children and adult patients who lack capacity, on the one hand; and, allowing medical professionals to make disclosures when such disclosures are deemed to be in the best interests of their patients, on the other? Much of this analysis has already been conducted in the previous sections of this paper, when determining the extent of patients’ rights to confidentiality and also the extent of medical professionals’ duties of confidentiality to their child and adult patients who lack capacity. However, one key fact has been omitted: Throughout this paper we have seen how many of the exceptions available at law to patients’ rights to confidentiality depend upon a notion of the ‘public interest’. It should be noted that the courts have been reluctant to provide any categorical definitions of this phrase. Rather, they have approached the matter on a case by case basis, with pragmatism. Those cases in which the Courts have held disclosure to be in breach of patients’ rights to confidentiality generally have involved circumstances where information has been released for interests other than those pertaining to the welfare of particular patients. For example, in the case of X v Y [1988][21] Rose J held that the disclosure of medical information for the purposes of protecting other employees was not a sufficient ground upon which to invoke the public interest defence. In cases where the disclosure was made in the interests of that patient, particularly, then the Courts are therefore likely to be more willing to allow the public interest defence to succeed. This makes sense, when one considers that the Courts are generally concerned with the harm or potential for harm caused by a disclosure to the patient over which the sensitive medical information pertains[22]. The Courts and medical professionals should also take into account that it is in the public interest to protect patients’ rights to confidentiality wherever possible. As Leung (2000) notes, if the right to confidentiality is not protected, then this could have far-reaching adverse consequences on the level of healthcare which is able to be provided by the National Health Service—patients will be less willing to be open and honest about sensitive facts, and therefore it may be less easy to diagnose and treat such persons[23]. What, if any, mechanisms are in place to review the conduct of medical professionals and hold accountable any medical professionals who fail to adhere to the limits of the discretion conferred upon them by the law of England and Wales? Of course, the primary mechanism which is in place is the right to private law action which patients are entitled to pursue in the event of a perceived breach of their data protection or privacy rights. The result of such actions will depend upon whether or not, in any given case, the court deems it appropriate to allow the defendant medical professional(s) to enjoy the protection afforded by the public interest defence. As we have argued in the previous section of this paper, where the reasons for disclosure were based solely on considerations of the particular patient’s welfare, then it is highly likely that the claimant’s case will fail. However, not every victim of breach will decide to take legal action and therefore it is not wholly appropriate to rely upon this mechanism to ensure that medical professionals remain compliant with their data protection and confidentiality duties. That having been said, this author can find no evidence of any other mechanisms which have been developed to measure compliance in this regard. Conclusions: The statement at the top of this paper suggests that it is difficult for medical professionals to decide whether or not to disclose personal information of children and adult patients who lack capacity to 3rd parties, when to do so is in the interests of the welfare of their particular patients. In fact, as we have seen, so long as the interests contemplated really are based upon considerations of patient welfare, then this decision is not a difficult one at all: Disclosure is such cases should be made. The fact that the patients themselves are unable to provide consent or, more importantly, withhold it, makes this assessment all the more easy. In regard to how well the law manages to safeguard the rights of children and adult patients who lack capacity to confidentiality: These rights are all, without exception, conditional and capable of being overridden in the public interest. While the Courts do seem to approach determinations of when the public interest defence should be allowed to succeed in a pragmatic and sensible way, taking into account the harm caused by each breach in question; it is arguable that some form of monitoring and accountability mechanism should be introduced at the practitioner level, to ensure that medical professionals are remaining compliant even where their patients, for whatever reasons, do not decide to take legal action for perceived breaches of their data protection and privacy rights. References: The Data Protection Act 1998 The Data Protection Directive, European Directive 95/46/EC The Human Rights Act 1998 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 Rose v. Secretary of State for Health [2002] 2 F.L.R. 962 Bainham, A. (2005) Children: The Modern Law. Jordan Publishing. Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 GMC (2000) Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information. Available online at http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/current/library/confidentiality.asp W v Edgell [1990] 1 ALL ER 835 Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. Devereux, J., and Moore, R. (2002) Medical Law. Routledge and Cavendish Publishing, 2002. Stauch, M., Wheat, K., and Tingle, J. (2002) Sourcebook on Medical Law. Routledge Publishing,2002. Bailey, P. Harbour, A. (1999) The law and a child’s consent to treatment (England and Wales). Child Psychology and Psychiatry Review, 4, 30–34. Wei, G. (2002) An Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law. NUS Press Publishing, 2002. Leung, W. (2000) Law for Doctors. Blackwell Publishing, 2000. Footnotes [1] Section 2(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. [2] The applicable criteria are provided by section 3(1) to (4) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. [3] Section 2(3)(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. [4] Section 2(4) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. [5] Not merely asleep! [6] Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402, per Lord Scarman. [7] Bailey and Harbour (1999) p32 [8] Schedule 1, Part 1, section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998. [9] Schedule 1, Part 1, section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998. [10] Schedule 1, Part 1, section 1(a) and (b) of the Data Protection Act 1998. [11] Stauch et al (2002) p282 [12] Ibid. [13] Rose v. Secretary of State for Health [2002] 2 F.L.R. 962 [14] For example, [15] W v Edgell [1990] 1 Ch 359. [16] Cited by Devereux and Moore (2002) p343 [17] As Bainham (2005) p330 writes: â€Å"But what of immature children who would fail the test of Gillick competence? Here, the obvious implication of Gillick was that the parent’s right to give or withhold consent would remain intact, and this has been confirmed by the later Court of Appeal decisions. Are there, then, any circumstances under which a doctor may act against parental wishes because he judges it in the clild’s best interests to do so? It must be said that, as the law stands, this would be a precarious course of action† [18] Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371 [19] W v Edgell [1990] 1 Ch 359. [20] Bainham (2005) p331 [21] X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. [22] Wei (2002) p95 [23] Leung (2000) p45

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

Voice Over Internet Protocol Attacks Essay -- Information Technology

Definition: VoIP or Voice over Internet Protocol, is a type of transmissions medium that is responsible for the delivery of real-time voice and data communication. Unlike its analog predecessor in which the transport functionality was routed via the public switched telephone network (PSTN), calls are now converted from an analog signal to a digital format, which is what the Internet Protocol (IP) uses for transmission and delivery, making VoIP possible. Several other key processes, such as signaling, authentication, security, call control, and voice compression, are established by VoIP prior to and during the call setup phase. (Harper, 2011) Essentially, VoIP converts your voice into a digital signal that is sent via the internet. The signal is converted to a standard phone signal before it goes to a land line. There are a few ways that VoIP calls are made; computer to computer, computer to a network, and network to network. How VoIP works The way VoIP works is by using what is called an analog telephone adaptor (ATA). The ATA allows you to connect your phone line to your computer and that allows you to make phone calls across the Internet. The ATA converts the signal from analog to digital. The analog signal is taken from your regular phone and makes it a digital signal so that it can be transmitted through the Internet. One of the most popular providers for VoIP services is Vonage. AT&T is also a provider that uses VoIP and they include an ATA as part of its VoIP service. The setup is actually pretty straightforward, and is a pretty simple installation. Basically, what is required is plugging your phone line into the ATA, and running a phone line out of the ATA into your computer. Tools of the trade I... ...ding_voip.pdf Edwards, J. (2007, January 11). Voip scams, phishing, and denial of service attacks. Retrieved from http://www.voip-news.com/feature/voip-scams-phishing-dos-011107/ Harper, Allen; Shon Harris; Jonathan Ness; Chris Eagle; Gideon Lenkey; Terron Williams (2011-01-12). Gray Hat Hacking The Ethical Hackers Handbook, 3rd Edition (Kindle Locations 7554-7557). McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. Kindle Edition. Harper, Allen; Shon Harris; Jonathan Ness; Chris Eagle; Gideon Lenkey; Terron Williams (2011-01-12). Gray Hat Hacking The Ethical Hackers Handbook, 3rd Edition (Kindle Location 7554). McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. Kindle Edition. Harper, Allen; Shon Harris; Jonathan Ness; Chris Eagle; Gideon Lenkey; Terron Williams (2011-01-12). Gray Hat Hacking The Ethical Hackers Handbook, 3rd Edition (Kindle Locations 7552-7554). McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. Kindle Edition.

Monday, November 11, 2019

Man’s True Nature Essay

In Hsun Tzu’s, â€Å"Man’s Nature is Evil† the author explains why the human characteristics are wicked. The author uses basic illustrations of people’s jealousy and envy to prove that human nature is truly evil. Tzu’s essay proves through many examples that man’s nature is evil, and that everything that is considered good comes from people that go against their â€Å"evil nature† to make the concept of morality. Hsun Tzu’s â€Å"Man’s Nature is Evil† is a great analysis of human nature to suppose that in fact, man’s nature is truly evil. The writer uses metaphors and history of human kind to support his reasoning. This paper will analyze Tzu’s essay and propose with supporting facts that man’s nature is justifiably evil. Hsun Tzu enlightens the reader with evidence to establish that man’s nature is evil. Tzu explains how human kind is full of jealousy and rooted with sin. Hsun says man, â€Å"†¦is born with a fondness for profit.† He also says man is born with feelings of jealousy and hate. If man indulges in these, it will lead up to violence and crime. This is a prime example that man is born evil because signs of jealously and envy are stained in the most raw form of human kind. A prime example of this is how man is competitive. He struggles to do better than his fellow human. People try to get better jobs, nicer houses, bigger cars, and the scariest thing now is that they perform surgery to enhance their physical appeal. People of all ages are always jealous of someone else, regardless if they have money, good looks, or fame. These feelings are the root to evil and sin. Tzu continues his influence by speaking on how one must be taught the â€Å"rules† society sets forth so that they don’t become a criminal. If man were truly a good creature, would he even need rules to follow? Or would we need some form of society to place these rules? It is obvious by Tzu’s terms that if we have to ask these questions then man’s roots are questionable as well. He also implies that the only reason we have these â€Å"set of laws† is because a person was thinking outside of their nature. Tzu refers to these â€Å"conscious thinkers† as the Sages of society. Tzu continues by saying that good only comes from conscious activity, therefore asserting man’s nature as sinful and evil. Another way to think of this is using children as an example of human nature. Kids are taught how to behave and act by their parents. If nobody taught these children how to act, they would just act off of their instinct and nature. When kids are with their parents at grocery stores, they just grab what they want without knowing the consequences of stealing. Parents teach morals and instill ethics in the adolescent youth. Children don’t know any better about stealing and sharing until they are taught that. This proves that humans in their juvenile state (children) are selfish and only think for themselves. The only way that they â€Å"learn† how to be good is to be taught. This is the point Tzu was trying to reach. Mothers and fathers discipline their children and tell them to be â€Å"good†. Kids act off of impulse and natural feelings. If their natural feelings aren’t to be good, they must be the latter. This clearly suggests that man’s evil nature. In â€Å"Man’s Nature is Evil†, Hsun Tzu effectively criticizes his detractor, Mencius, who believes man’s nature is good. Arguing Tzu’s point, Mencius states â€Å"man is capable of learning because his nature is good.† Tzu criticizes Mencius for not knowing the difference between basic nature and conscious activity. Basic nature is how someone would react without having been taught how to approach a situation. Hsun’s main argument against Mencius is that he doesn’t understand the concept of basic nature and consciousness. Conscious activity is applying what you have been taught. This is the theme of Tzu’s belief that man is taught to be good and originally evil in nature. Continuing this theme, Tzu explains conscious activity by explaining the work of a carpenter is not his nature; it is in fact conscious activity. This is an effective analogy because it suggests that a carpenter must be taught his trade, it is not his basic nature. Man doesn’t know specific rules without being taught them. The Sages who think consciously are the basis of our rules. A basketball player wouldn’t know how to dribble a ball unless he was taught how. A man who knows nothing about the game, wouldn’t even know were to start from. Tzu applies this to humans’ nature in general. Suggesting that man is not good in nature, and that good is the product of conscious activity is the authors’ main point. Tzu states that, â€Å"Every man that desires to do good does so precisely because his nature is evil.† The authors’ evidence for this is the idea how a poor man strives to be rich or an ugly man longs to be beautiful. People want things that they don’t already have. This is incorporated in our society. This is the idea of popularity and stature. If subject A has something subject B doesn’t, it is in subject B’s nature to strive to acquire it. Tzu states this thought of striving to be good as an evil nature. Man isn’t born with â€Å"ritual principles†. Tzu explains life without â€Å"ritual principles† as â€Å"†¦chaotic and full of irresponsibility†. Therefore it proves Tzu’s theory of not being good in nature and we acquire it from conscious activity. The author compares warped wood to the core roots of mans evil and twisted nature. As with a warped board, it must be straightened by a straightening board and steamed and forced into shape. The writer uses this as a metaphor to compare an evil man to the warped board, and the sage kings were the straightening mechanism to conform the individual. This goes back to the idea that man is bad or evil in nature. Man is taught or forced to conform to societies rules. If these rules were not in place, man would go back to his origin of evilness. Tzu ends his argument with an appropriate analogy: â€Å"A person with two feet is theoretically capable of walking to every corner of the earth, although in fact no one has ever found it possible to do so.† Walking the earth suggests that we are all capable of acting good due to our conscious activity, but not every man will attempt to change their basic instincts. This is due to man acting only on nature. Tzu implies that if one was to think consciously, they would be acting righteously and not evil. This is the only basic problem in his arguments. But it is easily countered by looking at the foundation of humans in general. If mans nature was good, wouldn’t there be more sages compared to the rest of the population? Throughout Tzu’s essay â€Å"Man’s Nature is Evil†, the writer gives details why  the human is rooted to evil. The author, Tzu, employs fundamental instances of people’s jealousy and envy to confirm that human nature is beyond doubt evil. Tzu’s paper proves through many examples that man’s nature is evil, and that everything that is measured good comes from the small group of conscious thinkers that go against their â€Å"evil nature† to make the idea of morality. Hsun Tzu’s, â€Å"Man’s Nature is Evil†, is a excellent investigation of human nature to prove that in fact, man’s nature is justly evil. The author uses metaphors and facts of the human class to hold up his way of thinking. So ultimately man’s nature is indeed evil.

Saturday, November 9, 2019

Corazon Aquino, First Female Philippines President

Corazon Aquino, First Female Philippines President Corazon Aquino (January 25, 1933–August 1, 2009) was the first female president of the Philippines, serving from 1986–1992. She was the wife of Filipino opposition leader Benigno Ninoy Aquino and began her political career in 1983 after dictator Ferdinand Marcos had her husband assassinated. Fast Facts: Corazon Aquino Known For: Leader of People Power movement and the 11th president of the PhilippinesAlso Known As: Maria Corazon  Cory  Cojuangco AquinBorn: January 25, 1933 in Paniqui, Tarlac, PhilippinesParents: Jose Chichioco Cojuangco and Demetria Metring SumulongDied: August 1, 2009 in Makati,  Metro Manila, PhilippinesEducation: Ravenhill Academy and Notre Dame Convent School in New York, College of Mount St. Vincent  in New York City, law school at the Far Eastern University in ManilaAwards and Honors:  J. William Fulbright Prize for International Understanding, chosen by  Time  Magazine  as one of the 20 Most Influential Asians of the 20th century and one of 65 great Asian HeroesSpouse: Ninoy AquinoChildren: Maria Elena, Aurora Corazon, Benigno III Noynoy, Victoria Elisa, and Kristina BernadetteNotable Quote: I  would rather die  a  meaningful death than  to  live  a  meaningless life. Early Life   Maria Corazon Sumulong Conjuangco was born on January 25, 1933, in Paniqui, Tarlac, located in central Luzon, Philippines, north of Manila. Her parents were Jose Chichioco Cojuangco and Demetria Metring Sumulong, and the family was of mixed Chinese, Filipino, and Spanish descent. The family surname is a Spanish version of the Chinese name Koo Kuan Goo. The Cojuangcos owned a sugar plantation covering 15,000 acres  and were among the wealthiest families in the province. Cory was the couples sixth child of eight. Education in the U.S. and the Philippines As a young girl, Corazon Aquino was studious and shy. She also showed a devout commitment to the Catholic Church from an early age. Corazon went to expensive private schools in Manila through age 13, when her parents sent her to the United States for high school. Corazon went first to Philadelphias Ravenhill Academy and then the Notre Dame Convent School in New York, graduating in 1949. As an undergraduate at the College of Mount St. Vincent in New York City, Corazon Aquino majored in French. She also was fluent in Tagalog, Kapampangan, and English. After her 1953 graduation from college, Corazon moved back to Manila to attend law school at the Far Eastern University. There, she met a young man from one of the Philippines other wealthy families, a fellow student named Benigno Aquino, Jr. Marriage and Life as a Housewife Corazon Aquino left law school after just one year to marry Ninoy Aquino, a journalist with political aspirations. Ninoy soon became the youngest governor ever elected in the Philippines, and then was elected as the youngest ever member of the Senate in 1967. Corazon concentrated on raising their five children: Maria Elena (b. 1955), Aurora Corazon (1957), Benigno III Noynoy (1960), Victoria Elisa (1961), and Kristina Bernadette (1971). As Ninoys career progressed, Corazon served as a gracious hostess and supported him. However, she was too shy to join him on stage during his campaign speeches, preferring to stand at the back of the crowd and watch. In the early 1970s, money was tight and Corazon moved the family to a smaller home and even sold part of the land she had inherited in order to fund his campaign. Ninoy had become an outspoken critic of Ferdinand Marcoss regime  and was expected to win the 1973 presidential elections  since Marcos was term-limited and could not run according to the Constitution. However, Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972, and abolished the Constitution, refusing to relinquish power. Ninoy was arrested and sentenced to death, leaving Corazon to raise the children alone for the next seven years. Exile for the Aquinos In 1978, Ferdinand Marcos decided to hold parliamentary elections, the first since his imposition of martial law, in order to add a veneer of democracy to his rule. He fully expected to win, but the public overwhelmingly supported the opposition, led in absentia by the jailed Ninoy Aquino. Corazon did not approve of Ninoys decision to campaign for parliament from prison, but she dutifully delivered campaign speeches for him. This was a key turning point in her life, moving the shy housewife into the political spotlight for the first time. Marcos rigged the election results, however, claiming more than 70 percent of the parliamentary seats in a clearly fraudulent result. Meanwhile, Ninoys health was suffering from his long imprisonment. U.S. President Jimmy Carter personally intervened, asking Marcos to allow the Aquino family to go into medical exile in the States. In 1980, the regime allowed the family to move to Boston. Corazon spent some of the best years of her life there, reunited with Ninoy, surrounded by her family, and out of the scrum of politics. Ninoy, on the other hand, felt obligated to renew his challenge to the Marcos dictatorship once he had recovered his health. He began to plan a return to the Philippines. Corazon and the children stayed in America while Ninoy took a circuitous route back to Manila. Marcos knew he was coming, though, and had Ninoy assassinated as he got off the plane on August 21, 1983. Corazon Aquino was a widow at the age of 50. Corazon Aquino in Politics Millions of Filipinos poured into the streets of Manila for Ninoys funeral. Corazon led the procession with quiet grief and dignity  and went on to lead protests and political demonstrations as well. Her calm strength under horrific conditions made her the center of anti-Marcos politics in the Philippines- a movement known as People Power. Concerned by the massive street demonstrations against his regime that continued for years, and perhaps deluded into believing that he had more public support than he actually did, Ferdinand Marcos called new presidential elections in February of 1986. His opponent was Corazon Aquino. Aging and ill, Marcos did not take the challenge from Corazon Aquino very seriously. He noted that she was just a woman, and said that her proper place was in the bedroom. Despite massive turnout by Corazons People Power supporters, the Marcos-allied parliament declared him the winner. Protestors poured into the Manila streets once more and top military leaders defected to Corazons camp. Finally, after four chaotic days, Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda were forced to flee into exile in the United States. President Corazon Aquino On February 25, 1986, as a result of the People Power Revolution, Corazon Aquino became the first female president of the Philippines. She restored democracy to the country, promulgated a new constitution, and served until 1992. President Aquinos tenure was not entirely smooth, however. She pledged agrarian reform and land redistribution, but her background as a member of the landed classes made this a difficult promise to keep. Corazon Aquino also convinced the U.S. to withdraw its military from remaining bases in the Philippines- with help from Mt. Pinatubo, which erupted in June 1991 and buried several military installations. Marcos supporters in the Philippines staged a half dozen coup attempts against Corazon Aquino during her term in office, but she survived them all in her low-key yet stubborn political style. Although her own allies urged her to run for a second term in 1992, she adamantly refused. The new 1987 Constitution forbade second terms, but her supporters argued that she was elected before the constitution came into effect and did not apply to her. Retirement Years and Death Corazon Aquino supported her Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos in his candidacy to replace her as president. Ramos won the 1992 presidential election in a crowded field, although he was far short of a majority of the vote. In retirement, former President Aquino frequently spoke out on political and social issues. She was particularly vocal in opposing later presidents attempts to amend the constitution to allow themselves extra terms in office. She also worked to reduce violence and homelessness in the Philippines. In 2007, Corazon Aquino publicly campaigned for her son Noynoy when he ran for the Senate. In March 2008, Aquino announced she had been diagnosed with colorectal cancer. Despite aggressive treatment, she passed away on August 1, 2009, at the age of 76. She did not get to see her son Noynoy elected president; he took power on June 30, 2010. Legacy Corazon Aquino had a tremendous impact on her nation and on the worlds perception of women in power. She has been described as both the mother of Philippine democracy and as the housewife who led a revolution. Aquino has been honored, both during and after her lifetime, with major international awards including the United Nations Silver Medal, the Eleanor Roosevelt  Human Rights Award, and the Womens International Center International Leadership Living Legacy Award. Sources â€Å"Corazon C. Aquino.†Ã‚  Presidential Museum and Library.Editors of the Encyclopà ¦dia Britannica. Corazon Aquino.  Encyclopà ¦dia Britannica.  Maria Corazon Cojuangco Aquino.  National Historical Commission of the Philippines.

Wednesday, November 6, 2019

Texting while driving should be illegal

Texting while driving should be illegal Introduction Texting while one is driving can be defined as that act whereby one sends, reads, emails or composes text messages through the mobile phone while at the same time operating a motor vehicle (Ishigami Klein 157).Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Texting while driving should be illegal specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More With the onset of modern day technology, individuals are now in a better position to communicate easily with others despite their busy schedules, regardless of where they are or what they may be doing at that particular time. This habit of texting while driving has been perceived by majority of individuals and authorities as being dangerous (McCartt 1). From recent studies that have been conducted, it has been revealed that approximately 9 out of 10 American citizens aged between 18 years and 36 years hold the same belief that texting while driving is distracting as well as risky (Beede Kass 415). In addition, approximately 66% of American adults have been observed to email or read text messages from their mobile phones while driving to their various destinations. Essay As much as majority of American individuals and the rest of the world may agree that texting while driving is not only distracting but also dangerous, there are a few individuals who may argue that texting while driving should be made legal. When SMS, also known as Short Message Service was introduced in the cellular phone industry, it immediately became evident that it should be considered as a danger as far as road safety is concerned (McCartt 3). To consider both sides of the coin, it is wise to state a few advantages and disadvantages of texting while driving. As aforementioned, the cellular phone, better known as the mobile phone has brought about numerous luxuries and conveniences that make it sufficient for everyday individual activities (Ishigami Klein 158). Those arguing that texting while driv ing should be made legal suggest that the younger generation, that is, those between the ages of 18 years to 36 years are better able to use a mobile phone and thus are considered better texters as compared to the older generation, those aged between 40 years and above (Beede Kass 416). This is because those of the older generation did not grow up using such technology unlike the younger ones who have been brought up having learned to use the cellular phones at an early age. On the other hand, one of the disadvantages of texting while driving is because of its sole reason of creating a distraction for that particular individual thus making them not to pay full attention to the road ahead or the various road signs along the way (Beede Kass 417).Advertising Looking for essay on law? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Texting while driving should be made illegal. To begin with, it has been observed from recent studies th at have been conducted that majority of American citizens are in complete agreement that texting while one is driving should be banned as it is the leading cause of numerous road accidents that could have been avoided (Ishigami Klein 159). An example is given of an individual who was on his way to Seattle and happened to take his eyes off the road in order to scan an email on his mobile phone (McCartt 5). In that very second, he hit a Mazda that was in front of him, which in turn clipped a green Honda that rammed into a Toyota, before spinning into the opposite lane (Ishigami Klein 159). It then plowed into a city bus that was moving in the opposite direction. Fortunately no one was seriously hurt from the incident. However, this is just one of the many accidents that have been caused due to texting while driving, some of which have led to either serious injuries to the parties involved or even death (Beede Kass 418). A few states in American are now proposing bills that would en sure fining of drivers if caught texting while driving (McCartt 11). Current laws as concerns road safety only allow law enforcement officers to pull over drivers who have been caught texting while driving if they have committed another law as well as far as road safety is concerned. If these bills are accepted, approved and passed, law enforcers will pull over drivers caught texting while driving even if no other law has been committed (Beede Kass 420). In the states of New Jersey, Washington, Virgin Islands and California, laws banning the use of cellular phones while driving are already being implemented. Those found violating this law are fined up to $100. Conclusion In order for texting while driving to become illegal, governments as well as societies in general need to contribute to the implementation of policies and laws set forth for this reason. For instance, parents should clearly state the consequences involved as concerns breaking the law while driving as this has been observed to be a major contributor in the prevention of unnecessary road accidents. The older generation or adults should be a good example for the younger ones through reinforcement of good driving habits as well as praising their efforts in doing what is right under the road safety laws and regulations.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Texting while driving should be illegal specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Beede, Kristen E. and Kass, Steven J. â€Å"Engrossed in Conversation: The Impact of Cell Phones on Simulated Driving Performance.† Accident Analysis Prevention. 2006. Pp. 415 – 421. Ishigami, Yoko and Klein, Raymond M. â€Å"Is a Hands-free Phone Safer than a Handheld Phone?† Journal of Safety Research, 40. 2009. Pp. 157 – 164. McCartt, Anne T. Driven to Distraction: Technological Devices and Vehicle Safety. Arlington, Va: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2009. Pp. 1  œ 15.

Monday, November 4, 2019

Cultural Forms and Rituals Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Cultural Forms and Rituals - Essay Example There are similarities between the Holy Bible and the Odyssey. The two masterpieces use singing to show joy. The two art masterpieces use singing to show praise. The three masterpieces use singing to the community’s unity. First, the Holy Bible and the Odyssey indicate the people use singing to express happiness. Homer (20) emphasizes the Odyssey culture states â€Å"He was singing of the return of the Achaeans, that bitter trip Athena made them take when they sailed home from Troy (Homer).† The verse clearly shows that the singer is happy with return of Achaeans. Just like people of the current 21st century generation, people sing whenever they are happy. In addition, another verse goes â€Å"There’s nothing wrong with this man’s singing of the evil fate of the Danaans, for men praise the most the song which they have heard most recently† (Homer 21). The verse clearly shows that the people use singing as a form of religious worship. The people use singing to add more color or persuasiveness to each religious ritual. In the same manner, the Holy Bible’s (Holman732) Psalm 105:43 states â€Å"So he brought his people out with joy, his chosen ones with singing.† The verse indicates that the people in the community are united. The united people sang for joy. The people gladly joined in the singing activities to prove they have the same intentions as the other members of a group. Second, the Holy Bible and the Odyssey indicate the people use singing to express love. Likewise, another verse indicates â€Å"At that point, the suitors switched to dancing and to singing lovely songs. They amused themselves until dark evening came.†(Homer 24). The verse clearly shows that the suitors are united. The suitors are happy to see the main purpose of their love, the women of their dreams. The girls will surely be enchanted by their suitor’s singing. The Holy Bible’s (Stebbins 254) 1 Samuel 17: 6†¦states â€Å"and it came to pass as they cam, when David was returned from the slaughter of the Philistine, that the women came out of all the cities of Israel, singing and dancing, to meet King Saul, with tabrets, with joy, and with instruments of music.† Third, the Holy Bible and the Odyssey use singing during their worship services. In the Odyssey story, the people will choose which song fits their current religious active ties. In terms of singing, the Holy Bible shows that the dedication of the wall of Jerusalem, Nehemiah 12:27 was filled with â€Å"singing, with cymbals, harps, and lyres. The company of singers gathered together from the circuit around Jerusalem and from the villages of the Netophathifes.† (Hagen 442)The verse clearly shows that people around Jerusalem and from the nearby Netophathifes showed their happiness by singing. The Holy Bible’s Isaiah 52:9 states â€Å"Break forth together into singing, you ruins of Jerusalem; for the Lord has comforted his people.† (Hagen 852). The verse clearly indicates that the people sing because they are in praise mode. Singing increases the level of the praying. Lastly, 1 Chronicles 16:7 indicates â€Å"Then on that day David first appointed the singing of praises to the Lord by A Saph and his kindred.† The Holy Bible’s (Holman 551) 2 Chronicles 20:27-278 states â€Å"Then Hezekiah ordered that the burnt offering be offered on the altar. When the burnt offerings began, the song of the Lord and the trumpets began, accompanied by the instruments of David king of Israel. The whole assembly was worshipping, singing the song, and blowing the trumpets –

Saturday, November 2, 2019

International political economy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

International political economy - Essay Example Entrepreneurs, leading corporations, and even social activists are taking the step to show how this phenomenon is changing the lives of people across the world. This book forms the basis for this review as it tries to identify the realism of this phenomenon, and if the corporate world is entirely ready for it. The definition of social business in this book is that it is a sustainable business that guarantees return on start-up capital, but does not offer investors any return. It is the author’s belief that the current practices, for example; social enterprises and non-profit are what may lead to more poverty among countless individuals. Social business offers an owner a return on their start-up capital, regardless of the time it takes to get this capital back. According to the author, this phenomenon (social business) has stopped being just a theory that is discussed in corporate boardrooms, and is being introduced in some areas in Asia, the U.S., and even Europe. By introduci ng, embracing, and trying the social business theory, the author develops an idea about a new form of capitalism that is opposed to some current methods and practices present in most organizations (Yunus 2011, p. 103). Products offered by social businesses may rake in profit, but do not offer dividends (Yunus 2011, p. 229). They are also capable of satisfying the needs of the less wealthy individuals in society. All profits gained have to go back to the society in which the business is located. According to the author, the case studies are a way of showing individuals that it is possible to incorporate this in the economic world and find a way to provide everyone with their needs. This is while reducing the pressure of money among the less privileged. Something worth noting about the author is that he is the founder of the micro-credit agency, Grameen Bank. It offers services (financial) at an affordable rate of interest. The author’s economic stand is brought out in the book as it struggles to change the perception that establishments can only belong to one of two economic camps, which are; non-profit and for-profit. However, the book might fail to address some crucial elements that surround the progress of the theory of social business. Some of the issues brought out in the book offer advice on what might be the best possible way for people to start their own businesses (Bari 2011, p. 78). This is not geared toward encouraging the growth of the phenomenon in most corporate structures in the business world. A great idea might lie behind the author’s intention of getting people to know what needs to be done to start and run a successful business. Sadly, it does not delve into advising would-be business owners on what needs to be done to exactly capture all the latest trends in the economic world. The ends of the first chapters in the book talk more of the steps in the development of the Grameen. This, according to me, makes the chapters seem lack lustre in their presentation. The didactic aspect of the book leaves no room for the profit and social business aspects that most readers may want to attain at the end of the book. It is next to impossible to attain a clear perspective on the part profit aspect of a